The European Chips Act (2023) mobilizes €43 billion in public and private investment to double Europe's share of global semiconductor production to 20% by 2030. Multiple fab projects are under construction: TSMC's joint venture (ESMC) in Germany will produce 480,000 wafers annually by 2029, Intel is building in Magdeburg, and Infineon and STMicroelectronics are expanding existing European capacity.
The motivation is strategic vulnerability: Europe designs significant chip IP (ARM architecture, ASML lithography, NXP automotive chips) but manufactures almost none of its own advanced semiconductors. The COVID chip shortage and US-China tensions exposed the risk of depending entirely on Asian fabs.
The challenge is economic: semiconductor manufacturing is capital-intensive with razor-thin margins at mature nodes. Europe's fabs will focus on automotive, industrial, and defense chips rather than competing with TSMC for leading-edge consumer electronics — a pragmatic recognition that sovereignty doesn't require manufacturing everything, just the chips Europe can't afford to lose access to.